


























































































































































217 Monitoring and evaluation 
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There are reasons to think that key elements of a performance-based budgeting 
methodology have already become a part of the mechanism for public expenditure 
management in Ukraine. At the same time, there still remains the issue of linking 
budget expenditures to the speciﬁ  c results achieved by speciﬁ  c budget programs. 
This deﬁ  nes the necessity of applying modern approaches to managing monito-
ring and evaluation (M&E). This study presents an analysis of the current state of 
M&E in Ukrainian public expenditure program management and offers some so-
lutions which could improve its utilization. 
Keywords: performance-based budgeting, monitoring, evaluation, budget pro-
gram, major spending unit, state special-purpose program, Ukraine
1 INTRODUCTION
After gaining independence, Ukraine designed its national budget system. Howe-
ver, the public expenditure management methods traditionally applied (such as 
institution-based budgeting) inherited from the soviet past quickly came into con-
tradiction with the turbulent economic and social reality, which demanded a much 
more effective and ﬂ  exible usage of scarce public funds. The soviet-type paterna-
listic state became hostage to high social expectations that were unsupported by 
sufﬁ  cient resources, ending in public ﬁ  nance collapse and hyperinﬂ  ation in the 
beginning of the 1990s. The message here was clear: the existing methods of go-
vernment expenditure management were inadequate. There was a great need to 
ﬁ  nd the right linkage between public needs and the resources available, as well as 
to create motivation for public administrators to manage these resources with bet-
ter outcomes.
Budget planning in the Ukrainian public sector before 2000 was built according to 
traditional soviet standards using incremental line-item budgeting. Under such a 
system, M&E activities were considered to be purely control measures aimed at 
checking the purpose-reliance of money usage within cost estimates of the main 
budget account holders (central and local bodies of the Executive). Since the ex-
pected results of public expenditures were not speciﬁ  ed and not checked, all cen-
tral government bodies performed activities reaching far beyond their natural sco-
pe (e.g., each of them run their own net of health care and educational establish-
ments). The collapse of the country’s public ﬁ  nance in the beginning of 1990s has 
proven that such an approach to budgeting cannot be justiﬁ  ed anymore, and the 
government must deliver some publicly-justiﬁ  ed results; thus, its bodies must per-
form only those activities which stem from their direct functional responsibilities 
and be accountable for them.
Being a democratic nation, looking towards Western values in its social priorities, 
Ukraine has made deﬁ  nite steps towards applying the core elements of perfor-


























































































































































219 1998, when major spending units (MSU)1 at the national level became for the ﬁ  rst 
time obliged to submit budget requests complemented by the basic goals to be 
achieved within the year.
This process of shifting to PBB was accelerated by the adoption of the Budget 
Code (2001), on both the national and the local level, and of the Concept of Pro-
gram-Based Budgeting in the Budget Process (2002). MSUs responsibilities 
within the budget process were clariﬁ  ed – i.e. they became responsible for compi-
ling budget requests, approving passports of budget programs (BP), and reporting 
on their execution; BP-based public expenditure classiﬁ  cations were enacted, etc. 
Since monitoring and evaluation are core elements of PBB, some regulations con-
cerning the establishment of a monitoring and review system to trace progress in 
BP realization were enacted. External ﬁ  nancial monitoring was vested in the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Accounting Chamber, and the State Supervision 
and Control Service (KRU). The basic functions of BP monitoring were vested in 
MSUs. Consequently, one may assume that the Ukrainian government has achie-
ved some progress in this ﬁ  eld.
Nevertheless, as many Ukrainian public sector researchers showed (Sanzharo-
vskyi and Polianski, 2007; Heyets, 2008; Krupka, 2009; Tertychka, 2002a, 2002b), 
there is still the absence of any uniﬁ  ed approach to carrying out M&E and using 
its results for improving BP implementation, i.e. there is a shortage of instrumen-
ts for tracking progress or evaluating the economic impact of public spending on 
speciﬁ  c BPs in view of national strategic goals. Moreover, there still remains a 
signiﬁ  cant gap between the current M&E approach and the budget planning fra-
mework. In addition, the information widely spread by Ukrainian media along 
with current legal prosecution of the top ofﬁ  cials of a previous government (in 
some cases connected with non-targeted usage of public money), suggests that in 
practice there are several ﬂ  aws in current M&E procedures, which make possible 
unsatisfactory state budget execution, as well as weak accountability of public 
institutions and their administrators. Therefore, the current M&E system as part of 
PBB in Ukraine requires considerable updates and reﬁ  nements, while its key ele-
ments should be reviewed and modernized according to the leading practices 
already implemented throughout the world.
Having as a background some recent positive developments in M&E sphere, the 
research questions of this paper could be set as follows: (1) to what extent does the 
current Ukrainian legislation provide a sufﬁ  cient base for an effective M&E of 
public expenditure programs; (2) how do MSUs and governmental bodies carry 
out M&E activities in practice; (3) what could be done in order to make the Ukrai-
nian M&E system more efﬁ  cient? In order to cover these questions, the paper is 
1 According to Ukrainian legislation, major spending units are the separate national public bodies of different 
status (ministries, state committees, public agencies, etc.) which are assigned to receive allocations from the 


























































































































































220 divided into the following sections: ﬁ  rstly, we give a short theoretical overview of 
PBB and of the important component of M&E; secondly, we review the current 
situation of legal provisions for M&E; thirdly, the actual state of M&E is presen-
ted; ﬁ  nally, some conclusions and political recommendations are formulated.
2 MONITORING AND EVALUATION AS AN INTEGRAL PART
OF PERFORMANCE-BASED BUDGETING
Being a part of a “new public management” concept, PBB has been a signiﬁ  cant 
part of the modern practical approach to public budgeting in the early 1990s, 
being a recent development in the performance-based management domain2. The 
concept of performance-based management itself, along with its basic compon-
ents, could be considered an attempt to apply well-known business strategies in 
the management of big companies to the public sector in order to increase public 
trust in the government, which is widely believed to be inveterately inefﬁ  cient. As 
Jack Diamond (2003) noted, its introduction jumpstarted the fundamental structu-
ral change of public budget management systems in many OECD countries and 
beyond. 
In many countries, adoption of PBB could be considered a reaction to the pro-
blems associated with traditional line-item (incremental) budgeting, where public 
agencies were held accountable for the amounts of money they spent (so called 
“procedural accountability”), but not for the results achieved. So, the main goal of 
introducing PBB was to bridge a gap between spending on inputs dedicated to the 
agency’s program, and its real achievements in terms of speciﬁ  ed performance 
indicators (PI), which are believed to truly reﬂ  ect required social and economic 
improvements and in this way to switch public management to “result-based ac-
countability”. 
Basically, PBB involves setting public goals for programs reﬂ  ecting national stra-
tegies that should be a benchmark for the success of any program-related spen-
ding; these long-term outcomes are based on medium-term results which, in turn, 
rely on delivery of speciﬁ  c products supposed to result from activities for which 
public funding was used. The linkage of public expenditure program funding, 
program implementation and the impact on the achievement of (societal and orga-
nizational) strategic objectives, is aimed at an optimum allocation of ﬁ  nancial re-
sources among program activities and producing higher social welfare. This also 
means: PBB is only possible when permanent monitoring of program implemen-
tation as well as periodical evaluation is involved.
To achieve the goals set, it is important regularly to monitor the progress of pro-
gram execution and periodically to conduct an evaluation of its impact. As the 
strategic priorities and the amount of available ﬁ  nancial resources may ﬂ  uctuate 
(depending on many factors, especially in times of a global economic turbulence), 


























































































































































221 the evaluation of programs against progress-in-goals-achieved must constitute an 
important element of PBB. Finding the right balance between spending ﬂ  exibility 
and reaching publicly-expected results is a great challenge because the public 
goals themselves are subject to periodic revision (GAO, 2002). Of course, the 
degree of attainment of planned PI values – primarily indicators of impact – de-
pends on the effectiveness of program implementation and is closely related to the 
quality of each related activity’s management.
It is obvious that PBB cannot solve all the problems encountered in public budge-
ting. Despite the time spent and the substantial efforts involved, one of the most 
critical issues in PBB remains ﬁ  nding links between performance planning and 
public resource allocation; these links must be secured during the planning phase 
of the budget process. As a study of early US experience showed (GAO, 1997); 
failure in this issue will undermine the positive results of PBB implementation. 
Some practical evidence suggests (Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, 
2001), while PBB generated a higher level of accountability than in the traditional 
approach, it was not too successful in generating greater efﬁ  ciency in public pro-
grams. The reasons why this promising approach did not give the expected results, 
may be rooted in the political component of budgeting, as some researchers argue 
(Thomas, 2007).
Since the primary goal of this paper lies in analyzing the M&E component of 
PBB, we ﬁ  rst have to deﬁ  ne these two interrelated speciﬁ  c activities – monitoring 
and evaluation. In accordance with notions used in documents of international 
organizations (Sanzharovskyi and Polianski, 2007:13-14), monitoring can be de-
ﬁ  ned as a continuing function that uses systematic data collection on speciﬁ  ed 
indicators to provide the management and the key stakeholders with ongoing in-
formation on the achievement of objectives and the usage of program-related 
funds. Monitoring data should be used in program evaluation.
Evaluation usually is deﬁ  ned as a systematic and objective assessment of an on-
going or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and 
results; its aim is to determine the activity relevance, measure the fulﬁ  lment of 
objectives, efﬁ  ciency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. Evaluation should 
provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of les-
sons learned into the decision-making process of all public sector stakeholders. 
M&E should not only assist the public bodies and society in identifying whether 
goals, objectives and speciﬁ  c PIs have been achieved, but it should become an 
effective tool motivating implementers towards reaching the maximum possible 
level of fulﬁ  lment of the goals set within existing funding limits. M&E should 
allow users to operationally generate, obtain and use complete and reliable infor-
mation on achieving PIs, determine the reasons for their deviation from the plan-


























































































































































222 scale and scope of implementers’ activities – e.g. whether to review the amounts 
of purpose-related public spending or not. It should also enable evaluation of 
short-term and long-term social and economic beneﬁ  ts obtained by the public due 
to successful realization of each separate program.
The core element of M&E activities is setting PIs whose values serve as a yard-
stick for measuring a program’s success. In order to serve the goal of monitoring 
and assessing the program performance, they should have the desirable features of 
being relevant, bounded (not too extensive in number), clear, understandable, va-
lid, reliable, timely, comparable, comprehensive, and reasonably within the con-
trol of those who are made accountable for their achievement (Jackson, 1995). Of 
course, it is an ideal which never can be reached in reality. 
The best M&E practices are primarily inherent to international organizations and 
non-for-proﬁ  t (nongovernmental) organizations (NPO) whose activities are under 
constant control of the donors. Their experience is generalized in some manuals 
and guides that are recommended especially for utilization in developing and tran-
sition countries3. However, individual countries tend to be selective in implemen-
ting the elements of M&E demonstrating approaches of their own that combine 
both universal and speciﬁ  c features4. Many transition countries achieved positive 
outcomes while introducing the modern M&E toolkit.
3 LEGAL BASIS FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE PROGRAMS
There is no uniﬁ  ed legal act in Ukraine which summarizes the mechanisms of 
PBB and M&E in the public sector, unlike in many other countries. It is worth 
mentioning e.g. the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), adopted 
in the USA in 1993, which was a landmark event in the history of administrative 
reform in this country and in the world. According to GPRA, governmental agen-
cies were required to submit ﬁ  ve-year strategic plans with measurable goals and 
performance targets; these plans were to be updated every three years; annual 
performance reports were to be submitted to the Congress; reports were to show 
three-year comparative data for PIs.
In Ukraine, the legal basis of PBB is constituted by a number of legal acts and 
bylaws issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU), Ministry of Finance 
(MoF), and other authorized bodies (ﬁ  rst of all the KRU). The most general act in 
this ﬁ  eld is the Budget Code, ﬁ  rst adopted in 2001 and then signiﬁ  cantly revised in 
2010. The Budget Code as of 2001 provided for the norms regulating implementa-
tion of audit and ﬁ  nancial control: they should be carried out at all stages of the 
budget process, providing, among other things, for evaluation of operations and 
3 Kuzek and Ray (2001), Mackay (2007), OECD (1998, 2008), Robinson and Last (2009), World Bank 
(2004), etc. 


























































































































































223 compliance of the results thereof with the established tasks and plans. The MSUs 
were supposed to bear the responsibility for the organization and maintenance of 
internal ﬁ  nancial control and audit at their subordinate institutions. External con-
trol and audit of ﬁ  nancial and economic activities, as well as analysis of budget 
funds utilization efﬁ  ciency, must be carried out by the Accounting Chamber and 
by KRU in the part of controlling usage of funds of the state budget of Ukraine. 
MoF was assigned the responsibility of controlling the compliance of budgeting 
procedures at all stages with the budgetary legislation, which referred to BPs as 
well. It is worth mentioning that this Budget Code version reﬂ  ected the obsolete 
“procedural” approach to accountability and budget management; so that it did not 
even refer to “monitoring” (operating instead with terms like “control”) and “eva-
luation” (“audit”). Further developments in public management towards PBB de-
manded corresponding changes in legislation, which were enacted in 2010.
The current version of the Budget Code (2010) operates with more advanced in-
struments and directly assigned responsibility for performing BP evaluation and 
monitoring to MSUs. This evaluation must be based on PIs presented in BP docu-
mentation. The results of BP evaluation could be used for changing budgetary 
appropriations in the ongoing and sequential years. MoF became responsible for 
elaboration of PIs in different ﬁ  elds of public bodies’ activity.
Table 1 presents the division of basic responsibilities and functions as concerns 
PBB and M&E according to other valid legal acts and bylaws. 
As visible in table 1, the most important subject to be monitored and evaluated 
(audited) since the PBB approach was adopted has been the BP. The main plan-
ning document on the basis of which M&E is to be carried out, is its passport. This 
passport should contain amounts of money assigned to a BP in a given year and PI 
values to be reached. The PIs include: (a) expenses (the scope and structure of 
resources which are provided for the BP, and the structure of expenses); (b) pro-
duct (scale and scope of products manufactured, services rendered or work perfor-
med, number of consumers of goods, works, services); (c) efﬁ  ciency measures 
like consumption of resources per unit of product (cost-effectiveness), relation 
between the quantity of the goods produced (works performed, services rendered) 
and the amount of resources allocated (productivity), reaching the objectives (per-
formance); (d) quality (the resulting quality of the delivered product that satisﬁ  es 
the clients and reﬂ  ects the declining negative or the growing positive trends in 
rendering services/goods as a result of funds spent on BP. The exact description 
of PIs is provided by the MoF in its Order No. 1252 as of 27th October 2009 “On 
Performance Indicators of Budget Programs”.
MSUs’ reporting on BP passport implementation to the MoF could be considered 
as a form of regular monitoring. But the problems that could immediately be iden-
tiﬁ  ed are whether existing PIs really could serve for the purpose of evaluation. 
The reason for raising such a question stems from the very fact that PIs as deﬁ  ned 



























































































































































Basic responsibilities of main actors in monitoring and evaluation according to 
current Ukrainian legislation
Legal act or bylaw on Actor Description of responsibilities
The Accounting Chamber of 





Controlling usage of the public funds according to requests 
of the Parliament of Ukraine, assessment of draft docu-
ments for programs which are supposed to receive the ad-
ditional ﬁ  nancing
The State Special-Purpose 





Submitting annual, interim, and ﬁ  nal reports on program 
implementation to CMU reﬂ   ecting its effectiveness and 
outcomes; informing stakeholders on progress achieved
CMU Reviewing implementers’ reports
MoF
Reviewing annual budgeting proposals concerning speciﬁ  c 
programs, monitoring related BP planning and execution 
MSU Controlling program task achievement
KRU
Controlling target-related and efﬁ   cient money spending 
within respective programs 
Approval of the Concept of 
Program-Based Budgeting in 
the Budget Process (CMU 





Organizing BP implementation according to its passport 
which include BP objective, BP tasks, activities associated 
with BP, BP PIs
Approval of the Procedure for 
Development and Implementa-
tion of the State Special-Pur-
pose Programs (CMU Resolu-
tion No. 106 as of 31/01/07)
Implementer 
(MSU)
Monitoring program fulﬁ  lment, regular (at least annual) re-
porting to governmental bodies and public on achieved re-
sults; carrying out analysis and evaluation of program im-
plementation
Approval of the Procedure for 
Holding the State Financial 
Audit of Implementing Budget 
Programs by Bodies of the 
State Control and Audit Service 
(CMU Resolution No. 1017 as 
of 10/08/04)
KRU
Carrying out “effectiveness audits” to formulate proposals 
regarding increasing the effectiveness of using funds of the 
state and local budgets
The Passports of Budget 
Programs (MoF Order 
No. 1098 as of 29/12/02)
MSU
Quarterly and annual reporting to the MoF on carrying out 
the BP passport as concerns amounts of funding and reach-
ing PIs; compiling the BP action plan for the respective 
budget year; reporting core factors responsible for deviation 
of PI actual values from the planned ones 
KRU
Carrying out control of the purpose-related usage of the 
funds allocated from the state budget to the BPs and of the 
effective program implementation
The Approval of the Procedure 
for Interaction of the Ministry 
of Finance of Ukraine as the 
Major Spending Units of the 
State Budget Funds and of the 
Responsible Implementers of 
Budget Programs at all Stages 
of the Budget Process (MoF 
Order No. 662 as of 30/05/07)
MSU
Carrying out activity monitoring of BP implementers on 
each stage of the budget process and evaluating feasibility 




Submitting feasibility evaluations concerning the three-year 


























































































































































225 Another point worth mentioning is the prevailing approach to BP evaluation. As 
concerns CMU and MoF, they mostly limit themselves to checking whether BP 
progress reports are submitted on time and whether the amounts of money were 
duly spent. It could be assumed that evaluation in the strict meaning of the word 
is being performed by the KRU in the form of a so called “effectiveness audit”. Its 
formal deﬁ  nition runs as follows: “state ﬁ  nancial control directed at securing
effectiveness of public fund usage as concerns realization of the planned goals and 
ﬁ  nding inhibiting parameters”. Such a deﬁ  nition differs signiﬁ  cantly from classi-
cal notion of audit which assumes a control function over quality of managerial 
activity; evaluation, in contrast, is control of program functioning (Kuzmin et al., 
2009). As we could see from the respective bylaws, the real content of “efﬁ  ciency 
audit” goes far beyond “audit” per se, being essentially very close to “program 
evaluation”.
According to CMU Resolution No. 1017, the main tasks of effectiveness audits 
performed by the KRU are as follows: evaluation of BP result compliance with 
PIs; evaluation of effectiveness of BP execution; detection of blunders and ﬂ  aws 
of an organizational, normative, legislative, or ﬁ  nancial character that hamper the 
timely, full and due implementation of the planned objectives; establishment of 
the level of impact that the detected blunders and ﬂ  aws have on the realization of 
the planned goal; elaboration of proposals regarding the methods (forms and ap-
proaches) of increasing the effectiveness of fund usage. The Resolution also deﬁ  -
nes the main instruments that should be utilized when carrying out an effective-
ness audit, e.g. analysis of regulations, calculations and feasibility assessments, 
methodology employed, enactments and publications regarding the activity within 
a BP which undergoes an effectiveness audit; the results of previous controlling 
activities, parameters of statistical, ﬁ  nancial and operating reporting; comparison 
of data on actually achieved PIs with the planned parameters in dynamics for se-
veral years, and with the nation-wide and foreign experience in the particular ﬁ  eld 
of activities, etc. The respective audit reports must be submitted to MSU to raise 
BP effectiveness, as well as to other governmental bodies which are responsible 
for public funds usage.
There are some weak points in this “effectiveness audit” approach, namely vague-
ness in criteria of BP appraisal. According to the KRU Order “On Improving the 
Audit of Budget Program Effectiveness” (No. 444 as of 15th December 2005), 
effectiveness evaluation of BP fulﬁ  lment should be carried out using the following 
scale: it is “efﬁ  cient” if the PI values exceed or equal expected ones related to the 
level of funding; it is “sub-efﬁ  cient” if the level of PIs is slightly below that ex-
pected for the granted amount of funding; it is “inefﬁ  cient” if the level of PIs is 
signiﬁ  cantly lower than expected in relation to assigned funding. 
Such an evaluation scale generates the following reasonable questions: (1) how 


























































































































































226 performance is “efﬁ  cient” or not; (2) to what extent the PI aggregate value may 
deviate from the “appropriate” level, in order to be judged as “efﬁ  cient”; (3) how 
is the appropriateness of the observed ratio between the amount of funding and 
overall PI levels deﬁ  ned? These questions remained unanswered, and this leads us 
to assume that many possibilities for subjectivity in BP evaluation are present. 
Summing up, we should admit that from the formal point of view, the background 
for PBB and M&E is present to some extent in the Ukrainian public sector, alth-
ough it has some problematic issues. M&E is carried out mainly in the planning 
phase (assessment of BP concerning its correspondence to the objectives of the 
state development strategy and funding capacity) and, to some extent, in the imple-
mentation phase (tracking BP cost estimate completion by the State Treasury and 
the MoF). As concerns the effectiveness audit, it is basically an ex-post control 
which is assumed to evaluate how a BP was performed after the budget year ended, 
so it has no implications for the ongoing budget process and needs to be performed 
as an element of medium-term and not only of short-term (annual) budgeting. The 
principal M&E risk under such a system could be associated with evaluation 
mechanisms where the procedures are formulated, but evaluation criteria are not 
well-deﬁ  ned, and with no possibility of correcting BP performance within its im-
plementation stage (especially when it is assigned to support a mid-term state spe-
cial-purpose program – SSPP), and, ﬁ  nally, with institutional/personal interrela-
tions of “controllers” and the subjects of their activity – MSUs in the ﬁ  rst line. 
4 ACTUAL PERFORMANCE AND PROBLEMS IN MONITORING 
AND EVALUATION AREA
Basing on our analysis of the legal base for M&E, we get the perception that the 
actual state of M&E as part of PBB will not be very impressive. This is a common 
issue for many countries with a transition economy. Only a few countries have 
undertaken signiﬁ  cant efforts in making government more accountable and achie-
ved some success; still, an OECD publication (2007) did not ﬁ  nd positive expe-
rience in such countries; Hilgers (2010) included in the list of countries with do-
cumented best achievements only one transition country (Latvia) among the many 
referred to in his study. The generalization of views on M&E development in the 
CIS realm (Kuzmin, 2006) involving polling of experts from ten CIS countries 
permit the following observations: (1) M&E activities in these countries were 
initiated by international donor organizations in the mid-1990s; (2) the willin-
gness of governments to be monitored and evaluated is still generally weak in 
comparison to NPOs, but bigger than in corporates; (3) among the countries whe-
re the government demonstrated more or less success in instituting M&E systems 
(Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia), this fact was likely strongly correlated with pro-
gress in PBB implementation and growing NPO involvement in carrying out pu-
blic programs; (4) the governments in the CIS countries prefer using an internal 


























































































































































227 The M&E performance in Ukraine’s public sector is also interrelated with general 
PBB implementation issues and its problems could be divided into several groups. 
Firstly, it is worth discussing the core element of PBB – explicit formulation of 
public goals and readiness of the government to link scarce resources to the level 
of goal achievement. Secondly, imperfections inherent in the actual legal/norma-
tive base for M&E activities including organizational issues, clear deﬁ  nition of 
tasks and capacity to fulﬁ  l them. Thirdly, obstacles for M&E generated by BP 
scale and scope. Finally, governmental bodies’ motivation and capacity to provide 
for a thorough M&E. 
In a PBB framework, a ﬁ  rst-rank prerequisite is the formulation of public goals for 
the government and its bodies; these goals through the use of speciﬁ  c PIs will 
serve as a yardstick for measuring the success or failure of a speciﬁ  c BP. The 
achievement of these goals and respective objectives is to be monitored and eva-
luated. 
Formally, there are strategic goals that are presented in annual, medium-term and 
strategic governmental programs. But the problem is that these documents are too 
politicized and thus very vulnerable to political turbulence, which has been very 
characteristic of Ukraine in 2000s. Actually, the recent Ukrainian governments 
have not presented their activity programs at all since 2006 (a happy exception – the 
year 2009) despite the fact that this is a constitutional requirement; in some cases 
governmental program approval was blocked by the Parliament (2008). As conc-
erns national strategy, the document for 15 years (adopted in 2006) was not inten-
ded to be passed by the Parliament and remained only a booklet to be presented to 
international organizations without big implications for BPs’ priority setting.
Such a background of “strategic planning” could not have adequate budgetary 
support because with no clear-cut goals there is no need to widen the budget plan-
ning horizons: until recently, Ukraine performed only annual budget planning (in 
2011 medium-term budget planning was formally introduced by the Budget 
Code). So we could assume that one of the fundamental problems of M&E of 
public expenditure programs was the lack of any medium-term planning of public 
expenditures on SSPPs which must be funded by appropriations from the state 
budget through respective BPs.
Lack of legitimately approved national strategic documents made state budget 
approval prone to the unjustiﬁ  ed redistribution of funds between separate BPs 
during passing of the annual Law on the State Budget in the Ukrainian Parliament. 
Lobbying activities of parliamentary members representing the interests of large 
ﬁ  nancial and industrial groups prevent the formulating of BP funding priorities in 
accordance with national interests and establishing a strict correlation between BP 


























































































































































228 This all creates a situation in which goals and objectives of different BPs as pre-
sented in their passports have no strict linkage to national priorities and the res-
pective PIs are vaguely deﬁ  ned – which corresponds to the well-known political 
vulnerability of clearly-deﬁ  ned and measurable indicators. Thus, there is no need 
to assess BPs and evaluate their performance; most BPs included in the annual 
state budget just maintain the previously initiated governmental activities disre-
garding their results. This undermines the desire to implement and operate an ef-
fective M&E system as a crucial PBB element (Kusek and Rist, 2002; Mackay, 
2006): there is a high risk that MSUs will not seriously consider their obligation 
to reach speciﬁ  ed objectives in the course of implementing BPs.
As Canadian student Thomas (2007:8) argued concerning a widely used performan-
ce-management approach, “most informed commentators conclude that overall it 
has been disappointing. Among the implementation problems which have been do-
cumented are the following: performance plans for many agencies did not identify 
measurable outcomes for their programs; even those measures which existed were 
not precise enough to use in management and budgeting; reliance upon third parties 
(e.g. states, commercial ﬁ  rms and non-proﬁ  ts) to deliver programs made it difﬁ  cult 
to obtain accurate and comparable data; agency results were affected by outside 
events and isolating program from non-program impacts was exceedingly difﬁ  cult”. 
It is clear from this statement that even in the USA, which was one of the pioneers 
in PBB, the key element of the PBB concept – performance measurement and usage 
of the ensuing information – is one of the most problematic issues. The same is true 
for many other countries. As an OECD (2007) overview showed, OECD countries 
encountered critical problems while introducing performance measurement concer-
ning: use of performance information in budgetary decision-making; relation of 
performance information to resources; measurement of activities; quality of infor-
mation; making sure politicians use it in decision-making; lack of institutional ca-
pacity of the ministry of ﬁ  nance and spending ministries.
It is clear that all these problems are also inherent to the Ukrainian M&E system, 
but they are aggravated by an overall institutional weakness in the public admini-
stration system. The public administration is at the moment beyond the reach of 
parliamentary control. MPs, in turn, in the absence of political competition, do not 
feel they need to care much about promises given to the voters. So, individual 
ofﬁ  cials seek positions in order to get a grip on free budget funding for their di-
rectly or indirectly controlled own businesses or exploit it for their own beneﬁ  t. 
Under conditions where society is being alienated from the formulation of policy 
priorities and is deprived of information on the performance of publicly appointed 
ofﬁ  cials, the situation with M&E could hardly be changed despite the modest 
steps undertaken.
However, at the strategic level of managing the budget system of Ukraine, the na-


























































































































































229 implies a rising awareness of the need for effective M&E procedures in order to 
increase the social and economic effectiveness of budget expenditures. Thus, the 
CMU “Declaration of goals and objectives of the budget policy for 2008” set tasks 
with regard to the development of “norms and standards of the uniﬁ  ed legislative 
base of the state internal ﬁ  nancial control system” and “implementation of a sy-
stem of continuous monitoring and measurement of the budget program perfor-
mance indicators for the purpose of managerial decision-making”. In an analogous 
2009 declaration, a goal was set to “conduct monitoring of the effectiveness of BP 
fulﬁ  lment by means of improving evaluation criteria” to increase the effectiveness 
of public expenditures. Thus, we may state that the Ukrainian government, at least 
on paper, understands the need for better monitoring and evaluation of public 
expenditure programs. At the same time, in spite of the above mentioned declara-
tions, the regulatory environment of M&E has remained rather disconnected, 
lacking the general methodology for M&E and incentives to implement it. 
From the very beginning of PBB implementation, some researchers have discus-
sed approaches to PI formulation (Pavlyuk, 2005). After the MoF approved its 
recommendations concerning PIs, it became clear that MSUs would not follow 
them properly. Some Ukrainian researchers noted the inadequacy of current PI 
sets used for M&E purposes: they do not truly reﬂ  ect the effectiveness and efﬁ  -
ciency of the spending of money on a BP implementation. Such conclusions were 
made concerning BPs in health care (Pryimak and Baryla, 2010), agriculture (Ko-
marova, 2008) and some other areas. Our study of a BP dedicated to the state 
support of coal mining industry brought us to the same conclusion. 
As it turned out, this speciﬁ  c BP’s structure has several ﬂ  aws stemming from its 
limited effect on industry. One is a strict limitation as concerns eligible beneﬁ  cia-
ries – only state-owned enterprises. Having in mind that many coal mining enter-
prises in Ukraine belong to private ownership in different forms, the overall effect 
of this BP on the coal industry may be doubtful. Alongside this issue, the reliabi-
lity of information for PI values could be questioned: most data sources for PIs 
belong to MSU’s “internal projections”. The background data for justifying a spe-
ciﬁ  c PI’s value is not provided with BP documentation and thus is not analysed by 
any external authority (the MoF ﬁ  rst of all).
The M&E of this program is based on some vague PIs speciﬁ  ed in its passport. For 
instance, one of the efﬁ  ciency PIs is “coal price”. An immediate question here 
arises: what kind of price serves as a PI? Since coal as a product has different 
qualities, each of which has its own market and thus price, we have to aggregate 
these prices in order to get a composite price measure. Whether this composite 
price could give us any rational information on what is going on in the coal mining 
industry is very doubtful. Even if we ignore this issue suggesting that composite 
coal price reﬂ  ect true market signals, questions could arise on how the state su-


























































































































































230 state support could be only one of many factors behind market supply-demand 
interaction (like import/export, prices of alternative types of energy, wages, 
electricity tariffs, etc.) affecting coal price.
Concerning reporting as a part of the M&E process, the study of this speciﬁ  c BP 
has brought us to the conclusion that it is far from sufﬁ  cient. Firstly, the reports 
produced on a quarterly and annual basis are too short (e.g. the most extensive 
ones were 5-6 pages long, the shortest ones were a couple of pages long) with only 
quantitative information on PI achievement. Secondly, the deviations from targets 
set in the BP passport were not explained at all; in many cases there were ofﬁ  ci  ally 
no gaps found between targets speciﬁ  ed in BP passports and those actually rea-
ched because the planned data usually had been corrected many times throughout 
the budget year5. 
Trying to understand the general situation with M&E, we have to start with BP 
assessment. According to legislation, BP assessment in Ukraine has to be perfor-
med at the planning stage of the budget process. The most important actors here 
are MSUs and branch departments of the MoF which review their funding reque-
sts and BP documentation. At this stage, the core problem is that only amounts of 
funding are reviewed, while PIs and their values are not assessed. The reason for 
this is the following: PIs and their values are submitted and calculated only after 
the ﬁ  nalization of the budget planning stage, after ﬁ  xing amounts of appropria-
tions to each speciﬁ  c BP. 
Our study of some other BPs showed that the authorized budget process participan-
ts concentrate during the PI implementation stage mainly on monitoring rather 
than evaluation activities. Currently, only three out of ﬁ  ve elements of the program 
cycle are subject to effective M&E procedures: available resources, activities and 
products, which, in fact, are of a short-term nature. The elements that are of a me-
dium- and long-term nature (effects and inﬂ  uences, their stability, etc.), as a rule, 
do not undergo signiﬁ  cant detailed analysis from the BP implementer side and re-
spective controlling authorities (MoF, KRU, and the like). At the same time, it 
must be noted that MSUs (and BP implementers) do not have special operational 
units or a corresponding administrative system to coordinate M&E activities. 
MSUs do not perform internal evaluation. Moreover, it seems that they are not 
really interested in performing it because the main form of such an “evaluation” is 
an internal ﬁ  nancial audit aiming to check the purpose-related money spending and 
procedural legal compliance. Generally, action plans of M&E activities were not 
even compiled, and no funding was reserved in the BP cost estimate for monitoring 
or evaluation activities. Thus, monitoring is carried out mostly on the basis of tra-
5 As is emphasized in some of the recent studies (NDFI, 2009), the main factor to be considered here is under-
funding of BP implementation. Under-funding is a usual practice of Ukrainian state budget execution especi-
ally in the recent three years when sequesters were a common issue. But there is no direct connection between 


























































































































































231 cing the achievement of planned ﬁ  nancial indicators (money spending) and pro-
duct indicators, while tracking of other data of BP passports is considered mostly 
a formality. As a rule, no independent experts are appointed in the evaluation.
Certain peculiarities of the Ukrainian approach to BP documentation make M&E 
quite problematic. Among these are obsolete forms/templates of main documents 
related to BP which prevent them from being utilized as effective instruments of 
M&E during implementation stage. BP passports include PIs which very often 
have no linkage to the BP goal. PIs are sometimes selected in a way that does not 
allow them to be measured directly because of the absence of relevant statistical 
information. Moreover, they may have no deep connection to the groups they are 
intended for (expenditures, product, efﬁ  ciency, quality). The last group of PIs – 
quality – is the most controversial because it cannot be objectively assessed; so 
generally the relevance of using it in M&E is doubtful. This could be a reason for 
the absence of systematic evaluation of the goals and objectives of speciﬁ  c BP 
achievement levels and of analysis of the main factors which may have an impact 
on BP realization. Despite the fact that MSUs are obliged to submit (along with 
their periodical progress reports) detailed explanation on why PI values deviate 
from the set ones, they usually do not do it.
All these could be reasons why the practice of controlling the achievement of the 
BP planned indicators and purpose-related usage of public funds currently domi-
nates the sphere of M&E. These issues were most often scrutinized in course of 
audits performed by the KRU. 
As for the MoF, it monitors BP implementation on a quarterly basis. But the re-
viewing process produces poorly informative results because it also concentrates 
mainly on legality and purpose-reliance of money spending, thus duplicating fun-
ctions of the KRU.
Reviewing of BP implementation, which is done by the KRU according to the 
CMU Resolution No. 1017 in the form of an effectiveness audit, could be consi-
dered a valid proxy mechanism for external BP evaluation in Ukraine. This type 
of audit, in contrast to traditional audits/inspections, provides analysis of the rea-
sons leading to violations in ﬁ  nancial discipline and ineffective usage of funds 
assigned to a speciﬁ  c BP, identiﬁ  es weak places in BP administration and results 
in the formulation of proposals aimed at raising the effectiveness of budget spen-
ding. Actually, effectiveness audit ﬁ  ndings differ from those of usual inspection 
materials since they do not contain instructions that are mandatory for MSUs and 
are not accompanied by preparation of a budget legislation violation protocol. 
Effectiveness audit reports are supposed to identify deﬁ  ciencies in BP performan-
ce, to provide an objective and unbiased basis for revising funding needs for the 
next budget year or to raise the issue on BP cancellation due to its inappropriate-
ness. Basing on auditors’ recommendations, the MSUs could optimize costs, im-



























































































































































Despite all of the above, interviews with MSU representatives reveal that the 
KRU’s effectiveness audits actually are not yet perceived by them as a useful tool 
aimed at improving BP effectiveness. Nowadays, there are many examples when 
KRU’s audit ﬁ  ndings were used not for ﬁ  nding ways of BP improvement, but for 
ﬁ  ling criminal charges against some perpetrators and the highest state ofﬁ  cials. 
That is why realization of recommendations produced in the course of efﬁ  ciency 
audits remains a big issue: in most cases MSUs do not approach these recommen-
dations seriously enough, on grounds that “they know better how to run the BP”. 
Their reaction to audit reports is rather offensive – frequently ranging from a letter 
of disagreement with ﬁ  ndings followed by a long-lasting exchange of messages, 
to silently ignoring them. There are no mechanisms which could induce MSUs to 
adequately react to those ﬁ  ndings, which could improve BP performance. 
Carrying out effectiveness audits at BP implementers’ demand is hardly practiced. 
Since 2005, only individual cases of the practice have been recorded, namely when 
new heads of ministries/departments were appointed because they showed true 
interest in knowing the real situation within their bureaus. Basically, the BP effec-
tiveness audit is initiated by the KRU based on its economic/social importance and 
on the amount of public funding allocated. In addition, selection of the subject of 
audit depends on the requests of other public bodies like the Accounting Chamber, 
the State Tax Administration, the Customs Ofﬁ  ce, the State Treasury, etc.
The current register of BPs holds about 1,000 items, so it is not physically feasible 
for the KRU to audit all running BPs within a budget year. As a rule, only few of 
them undergo this procedure. For example, in 2008 the KRU held 18 effectiveness 
audits, in the course of which the effectiveness of 63 BPs was studied. In 2009, 14 
effectiveness audits covered 54 BPs.
Given the current structure, the number of professional personnel of the service 
allows it to hold an audit of one BP once in every 15 years. In the case of annual 
evaluation, it is necessary to increase the number of personnel or to outsource 
more often. Presently, the KRU is unable to pay labour compensation to such 
experts, hence outsourcing has to be free of charge. In case of a radical decrease 
in the number of BPs in the future, the current KRU stafﬁ  ng might be sufﬁ  cient 
for executing efﬁ  ciency audits of all BPs.
Since the KRU’s limited staff capacity is related to the amount of work required 
to have all BPs evaluated, the issue of BP scale and scope should be mentioned 
here because their overabundance and weak compliance to the PBB concept cre-
ate signiﬁ  cant problems for M&E performance.
There is no ofﬁ  cial classiﬁ  cation of BPs in Ukraine. Some researchers insist on 


























































































































































233 ried out within several time periods) and annual ones (Krupka, 2009). From an 
M&E prospective, it would be also useful to distinguish BPs by functional crite-
ria: (1) BPs related to the realization of government policy within the framework 
of the SSPPs (they should be considered permanent BPs); (2) BPs related to the 
ﬁ  nancial support of governmental policy (e.g. transfer of funds to international 
organizations, etc.); (3) BPs related to administrative functions. All three BP types 
have been presented in the respective annual budget allocations; usually, the 
MSUs run all three different types of BPs simultaneously, which does not go well 
enough in line with PBB concept because speciﬁ  c functions assigned to MSU are 
split among several different programs, thus, also monitored and evaluated sepa-
rately. We suppose that expanding the budgeting time horizon to mid-term plan-
ning provided in the current version of the Budget Code (2010) would require also 
merging these three BP types within the SSPP framework.
For now, most BPs belong to the second and third groups to which, in accordance 
to the Law “On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2009”, approximately 89 per cent 
of budgetary allocations should have been assigned. The remaining 11 per cent of 
budgetary allocations are assigned to the ﬁ  rst group. 
There is no explicit distinction in M&E procedures as concerns the BP of the 
above-mentioned groups. But obviously, the functional speciﬁ  city of BP requires 
differing approaches to M&E. Taking this into account, the most complex are the 
BPs in the ﬁ  rst group, determining the prospective development of the national 
economy and society in general. The problem with this group is BP average scale 
(see table 2).
TABLE 2
Distribution of BPs of the ﬁ  rst group according to the planned amounts of funding 
for the 2009 budget year
Groups of BPs
















Up to 1  111 41.1 1,976 6.6
1-20 94 34.8 583 2.0
20-100 32 11.8 1,536 5.1
100-500 22 8.1 3,406 11.5
500-2,500 9 3.3 10,378 34.9
Over 2,500 2 0.7 11,847 39.9



























































































































































234 Based on the results of the analysis presented in table 2, 75 per cent of BPs related 
to the ﬁ  rst group operate on a very small scale (with amounts less than UAH mil-
lion 20); they accounted for only 9 per cent of budget expenditures in 2009; the 
average scale of a BP dedicated to governmental policy implementation barely 
reaches UAH million 10.
The problem is also that the small scale of a BP makes it almost impossible to 
measure their public impact and sustainability. That is the reason why the over-
seeing authorities opt for the simplest traditional (soviet-type) approach to evalua-
tion – checking legality and purpose-reliance of public moneys spent without dee-
per investigation.
Weak public involvement in M&E of the activities of executive bodies responsi-
ble for BP implementation is a common issue for Ukraine. The information about 
progress in BP implementation is usually not made publicly available, and the 
beneﬁ  ciary’s inﬂ  uence on the formation and improvement of BPs is very modest 
or even negligible.
5 CONCLUSIONS
PBB and M&E as its integral part cannot be considered a panacea for a decisive 
improvement of public sector budgeting. However, reality is pushing the govern-
ment to try new approaches proven as more effective for managing scarce resour-
ces dedicated to public service delivery, and to demonstrate its efﬁ  ciency and 
growing accountability vis-à-vis societal demands.
In Ukraine, the M&E system with respect to BPs looks incomplete: the legal ba-
sics regarding M&E have been introduced, but a rigorous approach is still lacking. 
There is need for a uniﬁ  ed legal frame for the whole public sector to regulate its 
institutional side and unify requirements for M&E implementation. The legislati-
ve and normative acts still lack deﬁ  nitions of the essence and tasks of “monito-
ring” and “evaluation” as concerns BPs and, thus, do not make formal distinctions 
between them. The current regulatory and legal framework does not allow a full-
scale evaluation of BP fulﬁ  lment, and thus does not create proper grounds for in-
creasing effectiveness in managing budget funds directed to a speciﬁ  c BP. As a 
result, effectiveness audit results obtained by the KRU do not permit a compari-
son of different BPs and respective managerial decisions.
Some drawbacks in the design and implementation of BPs are also observable: the 
linkage between BP goals/objectives and PIs assessing a program’s progress, is weak; 
in many cases, PIs do not ﬁ  t well for evaluation of BP performance; analysis of PI 
value deviations is missing; formal approach to BP action plan compilation makes it 
difﬁ  cult to control its implementation. Direct observation has also demonstrated that 
the current regulatory and legal framework does not provide effective stimuli for 


























































































































































235 Activities in M&E are mostly dedicated to controlling of BPs’ spending legality 
and purpose-reliance. External evaluation is conducted in form of efﬁ  ciency audit 
(performed by the KRU) and covers many tasks usually performed in the course 
of program evaluation. The results of monitoring and effectiveness audits are not 
fully taken into account in the public decision making process; information resul-
ting from M&E is not available to the public. KRU’s activities in conducting ef-
fectiveness audits are not fully effective due to persisting imperfections in BP 
documentation, lack of qualiﬁ  ed staff to carry out such evaluations on an annual 
basis, and the prevalence of ex-post analysis. Criteria for BP evaluation do not 
allow for an integral evaluation of program effectiveness, and, in the long run, for 
decision-making with regard to some BPs.
It must be noted that the formal character of M&E activities is largely precondi-
tioned by the situation with the state ﬁ  nance of Ukraine, permanent budget seque-
sters and problems with annual state budget approval (in the course of the last 
several years, it has been approved with severe violations of the Budget Code). 
Given this, monitoring BP performance is deprived of any purpose in the absence 
of proper funding. At the same time, this preconditions a call for instituting a 
working M&E system, raising the issue of reviewing the list of BPs, banning its 
further extension, and broadening the budget planning horizon.
To make some steps in this direction, the changes in BP legal framework, an im-
provement of M&E procedures, and better institutionalizing could be suggested.
Legal framework
First of all, there exists an urgent need to develop a framework document concer-
ning PBB and M&E in order to standardize the existing framework. As concerns 
the MoF, it would be highly desirable to approve a set of recommendations con-
cerning M&E methodology to be implemented at the MSU level. There also needs 
to be an approved requirement for each BP to undergo a periodical evaluation 
procedure with regard to its speciﬁ  cs and nature. 
Differentiation of approaches to monitoring and evaluation
With reference to the BP scale presented above, it would be useful to split BPs of 
the ﬁ  rst functional group (those connected to SSPPs) by scale of annual funding 
from the state budget into “large” (requiring funding over some threshold – e.g. 
UAH 100 million or more) and “other” BPs (requiring less then threshold amount). 
“Large” BPs should be monitored with advanced instruments and undergo a more 
scrutinized assessment and evaluation procedure in comparison to the “other”. 
Using this approach, it would be possible for controlling authorities to concentra-
te more on BPs with a higher risk of economic loss. The “other” BPs need to be 
assessed and evaluated from the point of view of their possible amalgamation, 
which will allow the KRU within short time period to progress to evaluating even-


























































































































































236 With regard to BPs of the second group, it should be noted that M&E measures 
here could be limited to monitoring the timely realization of budget appropria-
tions and guaranteeing the purpose-related usage of funds. Assessment of appro-
priateness of expenditures on BPs within the limits set should be realized by the 
MoF at the planning stage in the course of preparation of the draft Law on the 
State Budget. Monitoring these BPs could be carried out, ﬁ  rst of all, by the State 
Treasury and the Accounting Chamber.
With regard to BPs of the third group (aimed at administrative services), M&E 
procedures could be directed at achieving the maximum possible efﬁ  ciency and 
effectiveness of government authorities’ activities. Evaluation should reveal the 
extent to which the governmental authorities carry out their functions successfully 
and cost-effectively. In the future these functions should be merged with pro-
grams of the ﬁ  rst group and be subject to the normal M&E procedure.
Institutionalizing the monitoring and evaluation system
MSUs should institute a complex monitoring system basing on reliable data sour-
ces involving real-time on-line access of the authorized bodies to relevant BP in-
formation. To get this, new forms of BP documentation must be developed (BP 
passport, action plan, new format of BP performance report, etc.) 
There are three possible trade-offs in the course of action concerning M&E in the 
Ukrainian public sector as we see it now. They differ in depth of required institu-
tional changes. 
The ﬁ  rst (could be called “radical”) one involves pushing existing mechanisms 
towards making this system more objective and informative. Its prerequisite is the 
introduction of the institute of independent program evaluation. Today’s KRU 
could not be considered an independent institution: it is subordinated to the MoF; 
its auditing activity is deeply biased (speciﬁ  c MSUs and public enterprises are 
under constant pressure, while others whose administrators have good personal 
relations with the highest ofﬁ  cials are taboo), and mostly dedicated to “ﬁ  nancial 
control”, not evaluation. The MoF could be recommended to create a special unit 
within its structure the functions of which will embrace methodological issues 
(e.g. recommendation of PIs, development of guidelines for monitoring for MSUs) 
and assessment of BP documentation at the planning stage. Within a transition 
period, evaluation functions could be retained by the KRU; afterwards, the KRU 
will be back to its usual job of ﬁ  nancial audits, and evaluation will be handed over 
to the independent expert community. 
Of course, an external evaluation would involve additional expenses. How high 
should they be? As a benchmark we could consider the ﬁ  ve percent recommended 


























































































































































237 NPO spends signiﬁ  cantly less. So an appropriate expense level could be around 
one percent depending on BP scale and speciﬁ  cs.
The second (“modest”) option involves extending evaluation functions of the 
KRU to the assessment and yearly evaluation of all BPs. There are already some 
developments in this: in 2010, the KRU performed assessment of BPs documen-
tation to be included into state budget in 2011. As the KRU lacks instruments of 
BP evaluation, something like PART in the USA could be introduced in order to 
rank the programs according to importance and efﬁ  ciency or another approach to 
rank BP by effectiveness level.
The third course of action assumes that the current distribution of functions con-
cerning M&E will basically remain the same: MSUs carry out monitoring, the 
MoF performs BP assessment, the KRU continues the effectiveness audit. But 
even in this case, some beneﬁ  ts will be gained if new procedures eliminating the 
drawbacks described above are introduced. 
The choice among the possible approaches also depends on raising competitive-
ness among BP implementers. With the growing transparency of tendering proce-
dures for public service procurement and bigger involvement of NPOs in public 
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